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The Forgotten Law of Lobbying
Zephyr Teachout
ABSTRACT
For most of American history, until the 1950s, courts treated paid lobby-
ing as a civic wrong, not a protected First Amendment right. Lobbying was pre-
sumptively against public policy, and lobbying contracts were not enforced. Paid 
lobbying threatened the integrity of individuals, legislators, lobbyists, and the in-
tegrity of society as a whole. Some states had laws criminalizing lobbying; Geor-
gia had an anti-lobbying provision in its Constitution. Inasmuch as there was a 
personal right to either petition the government, or share views with officers of the 
government, this right was not something one could sell—it was not, in the term 
used by one court, a “vendible”--a sellable item. Line-drawing between illegiti-
mate paid lobbying and legitimate legal services was not easy, but in general 
courts enforced contracts where the thing being sold was expertise to be shared in 
a public forum, while refusing to enforce contracts where the thing being sold was 
personal influence to be shared in private meetings. 
During the mid-20th century, the practice of not enforcing lobbying con-
tracts fell away. This change came from two things: the growing sanctity of con-
tract, and the professionalization of the lobbying industry. State laws regulated 
lobbying instead of banning it. At the same time, as a constitutional matter, the 
law of lobbying occupied something of a no-mans land for many years—paid lob-
bying was neither explicitly protected by the First Amendment nor explicitly not 
protected. Supreme Court cases suggested, but did not hold, that paid lobbying 
was a First Amendment right. Only recently, and without much judicial discus-
sion, has the legal-academic community presumed that there is a unique First 
Amendment right to pay someone to lobby, or be paid to lobby, grounded in the 
speech and/or petition clauses of the First Amendment. The scope of that right is 
unclear. 
This Article tells the history of the earlier approaches towards lobbying. It 
explores the lobbying cases of the 19th and early 20th century courts, looking at 
the logic underpinning them and how courts distinguished between illegitimate 
lobbying and legitimate hiring of professional lawyers. 
This Article is largely historical, but has doctrinal implications. First, it 
shows that as a matter of practice, there is no historical consensus on a First 
Amendment right to lobby. Second, the length and breadth of the treatment of lob-
bying as wrong--not a right--is indirect evidence that the First Amendment was 
not intended to protect paid lobbying. Third, the reasoning of the courts that in-
validated lobbying contracts is still relevant to the degree of protection, and the 
kinds of activities that might be worthy of greater or lesser protection. 
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Introduction
One of the great debates about lobbying and its role in political society 
took place in the middle of July at the Georgia Constitutional Convention of 1877. 
The draft Constitution included a provision criminalizing lobbying. The propo-
nents of the provision argued that the lobbying practice that  had taken over their 
statehouse was corrupting the government.  Lobbyists had been paid to use per-
sonal influence to pass private legislation, or “private bills”: 
[T]he legacy  of the public domain…was bartered away to thieves and specu-
lators, who have amassed fortunes in this way, …. These bills were carried 
through by men who were employed to work in the galleries, at boarding 
houses, on the streets, in gambling saloons and other disreputable 
places—and when one thing failed to secure favor another was used. … I 
know my  good old state is groaning under a debt of millions put upon her by 
such methods.1
 The representative body had become a set  of auctions for public resources, to 
be sold to private individuals. However, the concern went further than private 
bills. Taxes, one proponent argued, are, in their last analysis, “dug from the bow-
els of the earth,” and the earth is a public trust that should not be stolen by those 
using influence to shift the largesse of the state to their own pockets. Even public 
bills could be used, strategically, in an extractive way. 
Lobbying
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1 SAMUEL WHITE SMALL, A STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION BY GEORGIA. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 80-81(July 25, 1877). 
 The opponents of the provision in the convention pointed out that there are all 
kinds of worthwhile bills that  good men have been paid to explain and translate to 
the legislators. So many with an interest or idea were “incompetent” to legislate or 
advocate for legislation. Therefore, they must have a right to “send parties here as 
their agents, or lobbyists, or whatever you may call them, for the purposes of ad-
vancing the interests of their community.”2  Without such a procedure, people 
would be unable to communicate their desires. “A lot  of our good ideas come 
from people who ‘have an interest in matters legislated upon, and who come here 
in that interest.’” Since one couldn’t  outlaw self-interest, outlawing lobbying 
seemed to merely cut out a particular class of self-interest. Many good men were 
what one might call “lobbyists.” What’s worse, criminalizing lobbying would cast 
a pall of suspicion over citizens who wanted to push for legislation, or even 
comes to the halls of the Georgia legislature to watch the procedure.  The propo-
nents countered that lobbying is like gambling: good men will do it, but that 
doesn’t mean it is good for society, and the question is a societal one, not just an 
individual one. Instead, the practical experience was that lobbyists cost the state 
money. Of the $11 million in debt, one proponent argued, a million was currently 
in the pockets of lobbyists, who had charged money  in order to serve private in-
terests. 
What is our experience? ... what are the facts? ... Go to the treasury  depart-
ment and see for yourselves!.. Lobbying through the legislature acts injurious 
to Georgia…It is a matter of disgrace and humiliation to us that Georgians 
profess to be lobbyists--hang round the halls of legislation--and those who 
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2 Id. at 101.
have the money can control even the legislature of Georgia. The people of 
Georgia have sent us here to put a stop to it  and to guard and protect the 
treasury.3
 The proponents won. In 1877 Georgia ratified its Constitution with this provi-
sion: “Lobbying is declared to be a crime, and the General Assembly shall enforce 
this provision by suitable penalties.”4  The next year Georgia passed legislation 
defined lobbying. It  included any  personal solicitation that was “not addressed 
solely  to the judgment of the legitimacy  of the bill,” or in which there was misrep-
resentation of the interest of the party pushing the action, or  in which someone 
was employed by a party with an interest in the outcome of the legislation. It did 
not include those services which were “of a character” to “reach the reasons of 
legislators,” such as drafting legislation, drafting bills, taking testimony, collect-
ing facts, preparing arguments and submitting them orally or in writing. The anti-
lobbying law was punishable by a prison term of up to five years.5  
 The debate in Georgia reflects how many  of the vexing questions surrounding 
lobbying have stayed largely the same in our nation’s history. Paid lobbying is 
often constituted by political speech about policy questions of the highest impor-
tance. Information and reason related to political matters are among the highest 
values in the liberal tradition; lobbying is the production and communication of 
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3 Id. at 102. 
4 GA. CONST. of 1877, art. I, § 2, para. 5. . 
5 WILLIAM V. LUNEBURG , THOMAS M. SUSMAN, REBECCA H. GORDON  EDS, THE LOBBYING 
MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL LOBBYING LAW AND PRACTICE 15 (ABA 2009, 4th 
Edition). 
information and reasons for political purposes. Lobbying means more information 
and more reasons for political decisions, and allows ideas held by private citizens 
to be dug out of the polity and placed in front of decision makers, who need to 
hear them. Furthermore, any laws restricting paid lobbying might lead to anxiety 
by citizens, journalists, and activists who--worried that they  might skirt  the edges 
of illegality--would stay away from politics altogether. 
On the other hand--as the proponents argue--widespread lobbying threat-
ens the political culture and the principle of equal representation that undergirds 
democracy. Inasmuch as it is effective, the function of paid lobbyists is to make 
their clients more represented than the general public. They  are hired as alche-
mists, to turn money into power through the production of information and the 
careful use of influence. That they do it within the rhetoric of reason and political 
power (instead of through brute force) is no special comfort. When lobbying is 
protected and widespread, those in government are more likely  to serve the inter-
ests of institutions and individuals with money, instead of representing the public, 
weighing each citizen’s interests equally. 
One of the persistent concerns is that lobbying facilitates extractive behav-
ior. The Georgia delegates were worried about the taxes, “dug from the bowels of 
the earth,” owned by the citizens, being given away, as well as more direct land 
giveaways to railroad companies and land speculators.6 Lobbyists would grease 
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6 Small, supra note 2 at 81.
those giveaways by using persuasion and direct and indirect bribery. That concern 
persists, albeit in a different form. 
Again, these old concerns are pressing now. Lobbying can enable substan-
tial profits, either through laws that  subsidize activities or through laws that are 
not passed. A recent study found that multinational firms received as much as a 
22,000% return on investments in lobbying for tax breaks.7 While other types of 
lobbying have less extraordinary results, if one uses the hiring of lobbyists as any 
evidence of their effectiveness, the relentless growth of the lobbying industry in 
the last 30 years is powerful evidence that the money spent on lobbying “works” 
for its clients, if not for society.  
Lobbying can also lead to more cultural harms, which are as serious if one 
sees democracy as a fragile and rare political institution. The social community  of 
a political place with many lobbyists becomes saturated with people who use their 
social connections to push paid ideas (or, as likely to throttle policies that would 
hurt their clients), encouraging cynicism. Inasmuch as Montesquieu was the foun-
tainhead thinker behind our form of Constitutional government,8 any practice that 
undermines the civic, public nature of government and citizenship  undermines his 
theory of government itself, wherein sovereignty--and the obligations of 
sovereignty--reside in the citizen. Lobbyists also use persuasion, also sometimes 
Lobbying
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7 See RAQUEL ALEXANDER, STEVEN W. MAZZA & SUSAN SCHOLZ, MEASURING RATES OF RETURN 
FOR LOBBYING EXPENDITURES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS UNDER THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT, 
25 J.L. & POL. 401, 404 (2009).
8 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 26, 345 (1992).
backed by  implicit promises, including the promise of a job. Staffers and Con-
gress members increasingly  become lobbyists after leaving their jobs, leading 
them to serve future imagined clients while still working for government. 
For some modern thinkers, it seems axiomatic that lobbying should be en-
tirely protected by  the Constitution.9 Paid lobbying is arguably protected by four 
of the pillars of the First Amendment: the speech clause, the association clause, 
the press clause, and the petition clause.10 However, there are interests of substan-
tial dimension on both sides of the lobbying question. And even if the possibility 
of criminalizing lobbying is unlikely at this point, the scope of the right  to lobby 
is unclear. The modern Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether there is 
a right to hire a lobbyist, or be hired as a lobbyist, and if so, the source of that 
right, or the scope of that right. This is unlike, say, campaign finance law, where 
the Court has spent 40 years debating the relative weight of the interest in speech, 
speakers, and political integrity.
This silence on the right to lobby stands in contrast to the well developed 
doctrine that arguably  persisted for almost  a century. In cases from that era, paid 
lobbying was presumptively not protected. Instead, it was viewed with suspicion, 
and lobbying contracts were not enforced. Temptation, civic virtue, and political 
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9 See Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional 
Right to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149 (1993)
10 See id. at 109. He also states that,  “lobbying seems to fall squarely within the ambit of the 
First Amendment right of petition.” Id. at 172 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
culture were discussed extensively in lobbying cases, and lobbying was a civic 
wrong, something to be avoided as a threat to self-government. 
In the years to come, the question of the scope and existence of a right to 
lobby will likely be addressed by the Supreme Court; it is already being addressed 
by lower courts trying to determine the legitimacy of laws regulating lobbyists. 
The goal of this article is to ensure that the early  law of lobbying is not forgotten 
in these discussions. Whether one is a strict  originalist, someone interested in the 
meaning of the words of the Constitution as understood and interpreted by those 
living closer to the time when it was passed, or someone who believes that  the 
Constitution should be interpreted consistent with the contemporary demands of 
democracy  (and democratic theory), the cases I rehearse here are essential read-
ing.
If one is an originalist, the persistence of the earlier doctrine is indirect 
evidence that lobbying was not intended to be protected by the original First 
Amendment. The First Amendment was not even implicated in lobbying discus-
sions, for over 150 years. 
The cases are also important for non-originalists, who bring a more conse-
quentialist, democracy-enhancing or protecting view of the First Amendment. The 
cases introduce important democracy-enabling considerations, including the im-
pact of paid influence on civic culture, the dangers of allowing practices that lead 
to undetectable bribery, and the risk of undermining government itself through 
systemic corruption. Finally, they suggest some manageable--if difficult--
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guideposts for distinguishing between what might be protected activity and un-
protected activity. 
 One of the goals of this Article is to resist  a certain fatalism that can creep 
into modern scholarship about  lobbying. For some modern thinkers, it  seems 
axiomatic that lobbying should be entirely protected by the Constitution.11 Other 
scholars treat the doctrinal question as settled, for good or ill: paid lobbying is 
covered by the First Amendment, and so we ought to accept it as a given part of 
our political landscape, whether or not it threatens the most cherished parts of our 
democracy. Moreover, given the razing role the First Amendment has played in 
the Supreme Court’s recent treatment of campaign finance regulation, there is a 
kind of learned helplessness around making any serious claim that lobbying is not 
protected.
I proceed as follows: In Part I look at  the cases of the 19th century and 
early 20th century, which universally condemned paid lobbying. I explore the dif-
ferent kinds of factors used by  courts to distinguish between lobbying and legiti-
mate professional services, and explore the vision of politics that  underpinned 
these cases. In Part II, I review the cases of the early 20th century, which neither 
condemn nor approve of lobbying, but  leave it in a constitutional desert, and then 
touch on some of the modern cases. In Part  III, I suggest  some of the doctrinal 
implications of this history, and argue that  we should adopt a view of paid lobby-
Lobbying
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11 See Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional 
Right to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149 (1993)
ing that treats it neither as a civic wrong, nor a right. Instead, legislatures should 
be free to impose non-content based restrictions on paid lobbying—and the choice 
should be a democratic one, left to state and federal legislatures. 
Part I. 1830-1920 The Traditional American Political Theory of Lobbying
≈Throughout the country, the sale of personal influence was treated as 
civic wrong  in the eyes of the law from the early 1830s through the early 1930s. 
There was no personal right to pay someone else to press ones’ legislative agenda. 
Nor was there a right  to be paid to use personal influence for legislation. Paid lob-
bying was looked down upon, criminalized in some cases, and treated as against 
public policy. As a practical matter, lobbying was policed almost entirely  by civil 
law. Virtually all of the cases dealing with lobbying were contract cases, with 
courts deciding whether or not to enforce contracts for “lobbying” services. Typi-
cally, there was no investigation into whether the underlying activity was illegal 
(as a criminal law matter) or not. Courts would simply declare lobbying contracts 
invalid.  As Supreme Court  Justice Field wrote “[a[]ll agreements for pecuniary 
considerations to control the…ordinary course of legislation are void as against 
public policy.”12  A popular contracts hornbook with repeated publications in the 
late 19th and early 20th century said:
Lobbying
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12 Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45, 56 (1864). 
What are known as "lobbying contracts" ... fall within this class of illegal 
agreements. Any agreement to render services in procuring legislative ac-
tion, either by congress or by a state legislature or by a municipal council, 
by personal solicitation of the legislators or other objectionable means, is 
contrary to the plainest principles of public policy, and is void.13
The First Amendment was never invoked in these cases. 
Inasmuch as a right to petition the government was recognized, it was per-
sonal, not sellable. One could sell professional services, but as the Supreme Court 
said in a frequently cited passage, “personal influence . . . is not a vendible article 
in our system of laws and morals, and the courts of the United States will not lend 
their aid to the vendor to collect the price of the article.”14 The language some-
times drew on property law, where sellable items are called “alienable,” or, in the 
language of the late 19th and early 20th century, “vendibles.”15 The question of 
what was and was not vendible was a matter of public policy, determined by the 
courts in common law. “Personal influence” was a good that any individual can 
use on their own, but that could not be sold.  It was more akin to the right to have 
children or to vote or to defend oneself—a powerful personal right, but  not one 
that can be sold..16 Like the modern right to vote, the right to contribute to cam-
paigns, the right to intimate relations, the right to serve on a jury, or the right to 
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13 WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 285 (1894).
14 Oscayan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 273 (1880).  
15 Certain financial instruments, debts, or obligations were “not vendible” as a matter of policy. 
For some examples see, e.g., J.M. Chisholm v. Andrews, 57 Miss. 636 (Miss 1880); Ryan v. 
Miller, 236 Mo. 496 (Mo. 1911). 
16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 4TH § 16:23 (2011).
have a child, the right to speak one’s mind to Congress could not be personally 
limited, but was not protected past the personal right. 
The key difference between lobbying and not-lobbying was the sale of in-
fluence. Lobbying, as described in these cases, is “the sale of an individual's per-
sonal influence to procure the passage of a private law by the legislature.”17  
Contract-making was treated as a privilege that should not be extended to 
lobbying, because lobbying would undermine the rule of law that it was using to 
enforce. For example, when the Vermont Supreme Court wrote about lobby con-
tracts, they wrote that “the law will not  concede to any man however honest he 
may be, the privilege of making a contract, which it would not recognize when 
made by designing, corrupt men.”18 
Two Old Men and the Compact Corps of Venal Solicitors
There are few cases involving payments for political influence in the early 
American law. Two are from Kentucky, and seem to contradict each other. In the 
first, in 1932, the court held that any contract to pay  another for getting a remis-
sion of a forfeiture, after being convicted, was a public wrong.19 Six years later, a 
1938 Kentucky case upheld a $100 contract, in which one man agreed to get the 
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17 Usher v. McBratney, 28 F. Cas. 853 (CCD Kan. 1874), (citing Rose v. Traux, 21 Barb. 361 
(NY Gen. Term 1855)) (italics added) 
18 Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274, 281 (1861).
19 McGill’s Adm’r v. Burnett, 7 J.J. Marsh 640 (Ky App. 1832). 
Kentucky  legislature to pass a bill recognizing his divorce and his new marriage.20 
The court in that case struggled. It saw the contract  as somewhere in between a 
legal contract for the price of delivering a petition on horseback, and an illegal 
contract to get a pardon, as in the earlier case. The principle outlined was that a 
contract to try to influence the legislators in a non-public forum would be illegal. 
“The law,” the court  stated, “should not help to compel the payment of a fee to 
any man, whether of great or of little influence, for his personal solicitations in 
favor of the enactment of any law whatever. Nothing could be more suicidal or 
unwise than a contrary doctrine.”21 It  upheld the contract, because it appeared to 
be merely for presenting the bill, preparing the facts and making a public argu-
ment. There was no evidence that the payment was for any kind of non-public or 
personal appeals, or the sale of personal influence. And there was no evidence of a 
contingency  fee.22  Therefore, on balance, the court concluded that the contract 
was legal, if on the edge of legality.   
These first case in which a court refused to enforce lobby contracts using 
the language of “lobbying,” was likely Harris v. Roof, in 1851.23 The question as 
the court put it was the right of a “lobby-agent” to enforce a contract. An old man 
hired a young man, Matchin (who later married his grand-daughter) to go to Al-
bany and get compensation from the government for an interest he said that he 
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20  Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana 366 (Ky. App. 1838).
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Harris v. Roof’s Executors, 10 Barb. 489 (S. Ct., New York Cnty. 1851).  
had gotten in land over 50 years earlier. Matchin agreed to try to get the claims in 
return an agreed upon amount. The two had a falling out, and the young man 
asked to be paid for the work he’d done. The older man refused. This led to court, 
and a heated exchange about the value of what had been done. Matchin presented 
evidence that he’d talked to a committee, met and spoken with members, and 
spent money on traveling to and from Albany. There were several witnesses who 
testified to the value of his work, and his presence at the state house. The older 
man called witnesses to show that he hadn’t really gone to Albany, and had been 
fairly ineffective.
The court, hearing this evidence, decided not to settle the matter on the 
question presented--whether Matchin had done his job and fulfilled his contract--
but on the grounds that the kind of contract itself was outside of public policy. 
According to the decision, all citizens have a right to petition the legislature, and 
present documents accompanying that petition. Putting those documents together 
and planning may cost something, and all citizens have the right to pay for those 
preparations. However, “all petitions go to a committee through the house.”24 
According to the court, every member of every  legislative body  has a duty 
to give the “proper and necessary  attention to the business before it, and “always 
have truth and justice before their eyes.”25  It would interfere with this vision of 
representative duties to hold that, “…the employment of individuals to visit and 
importune the members, is necessary to obtain justice. Such practices would have 
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24 Id. at 493-94.
25 Id. at 494.
a tendency to prevent free, honorable and correct deliberation and action of this 
most important branch of sovereignty.”26 
There was not much in terms of American precedent, so the court recog-
nized it had to improvise. “Very few cases similar to this, or bearing any analogy 
thereto, are to be found in our law books; and it is to be hoped ever will be, for the 
best of reasons.”27 The court drew upon the general rule against champerty28 for 
its logic, as well as its sense of political theory.  Champerty  is when a party  to a 
lawsuit agrees to pay a lawyer a percentage of whatever is won in a lawsuit. In 
common law this was generally illegal.29
That same vision grounded the Supreme Court decision in Marshall v. 
Baltimore  Ohio RailroadCo, a few years later.30  Faced with evidence that the 
plaintiff, Marshall, had been promised a contingent fee if he could secretly secure 
the votes needed to pass legislation, the Court held that the contract was void as 
against public policy. It explained itself this way:
Legislators should act from high considerations of public duty. Public pol-
icy  and sound morality  do therefore imperatively require that  courts 
should put the stamp of their disapprobation on every act, and pronounce 
void every contract the ultimate or probable tendency  of which would be 
Lobbying
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26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 See Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1297, 1341 (2002)
30 57 U.S. 314 (1853)
to sully the purity or mislead the judgments of those to whom the high 
trust of legislation is confided.31
On the one hand, the Court held, there is an “undoubted right” of all per-
sons to make their claims and arguments personally, or through a lawyer, in front 
of legislative committees.32 But if an agent was hired, an agent would need to dis-
close their true incentives. The secrecy surrounding of the contract necessarily 
invalidated it. Moreover, the lure of high profit  combined with secrecy  otherwise 
creates a “direct fraud on the public.”33  Legislatures had an obligation to the 
whole, and a court should not subsidize, through the enforcement of contracts, the 
opportunity for interested and “unscrupulous agents” to influence policy.34  Fur-
thermore, the practice corrupts the agent himself. The agent is “demoralized”—in 
the sense of rid of morals—by the lure of profit:
He is soon brought to believe that any means which will produce so bene-
ficial a result to himself are ‘proper means;’ and that a share of these prof-
its may have the same effect of quickening the perceptions and warming 
the zeal of influential or ‘careless' members in favor of his bill. The use of 
such means and such agents will have the effect to subject the State gov-
ernments to the combined capital of wealthy corporations, and produce 
universal corruption, commencing with the representative and ending with 
the elector. Speculators in legislation, public and private, a compact corps 
of venal solicitors, vending their secret influences, will infest the capital of 
the Union and of every State, till corruption shall become the normal con-
dition of the body politic, and it will be said of us as of Rome-‘omne Ro-
mae venale.”35
Lobbying
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31 Id. at 334.
32 Id. at 335.
33 Id. 
34 Id.
35 Id. 
Marshall involved a mish-mash of reasons for invalidating the con-
tract—the contingency fee, the commitment  in the contracting documents to se-
crecy among them—and this blend of reasons made it unclear whether contracts 
for influence would be generally disfavored, or only when these other features 
existed. 
The 1855 New York case of Rose v. Traux, which became one of the most-
cited authorities for the principle that  lobbying contracts should not  be enforced, 
also involved secrecy and a contingency fee.36 In that case the parties agreed that 
the lobbyist would “use his influence, efforts and labor in procuring the passage 
of a law by the said legislature, having for its object relief to the undersigned.” In 
exchange, he was promised 10% of the amount of money received.37  The key 
holding of Rose, which made it particularly  powerful, regarded the legal elements 
of the contract. The court held that it was impossible to sift apart the contract and 
separate the legal from the illegal elements. While there was evidence that some 
of what the lawyer did in this case was pure professional preparation, work which 
could have otherwise been lawfully compensated, the agreement to use influence 
to pass a law rendered the other parts of the agreement entirely void.38
The scope and meaning of these cases was clarified in Trist v. Child, 
which made clear that paid personal influence was against public policy even 
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36 Rose v. Traux, 21 Barb. 361, (NY Gen.Term 1855).
37 Id. at 362.
38 Id. at 376. 
when a lawyer performed the services, when it meant that someone might be 
without ability to influence, and when it  was not done secretly.39 Trist involved a 
contingency  fee, but the court explained that the contingency  fee did not decide 
the case.  
In 1866 an old man, too weak to travel to Washington himself, hired a 
lawyer to go to Congress and demand payment for an 18-year old debt.40 Mr. Trist 
claimed that the United States owed him money for helping to negotiate the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848.41 He hired Linus Child, a Boston lawyer, to 
represent him.42  Trist agreed to pay Child twenty-five percent of whatever he 
secured.43 In 1871, after Child and his son and partner, L.M. Child, made visits to 
Congress and wrote letters and made arguments proving the claim, Congress ap-
propriated the sum of $14,559 to Trist.44After the lawyer successfully persuaded 
Congress of the value of his claim, the old man’s son refused to pay the lawyer. 
Child sued him for the money owed.45
Trist’s defense was based on the logic of Marshall-- the lobbying contract 
was void as against public policy. The courts, he argued, had no business in en-
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forcing something so corrupt. This was a more squarely lobbying claim, because 
unlike Marshall or Rose, there was no allegation of secrecy. Instead, it seemed 
like a straightforward, aboveboard claim where a lawyer was hired to do some-
thing that an old man could not do. 
One could hardly imagine a more sympathetic context for enforcing a 
lobby contract; this was the constitutional test of the logic of Harris.  Child had 
been “open, fair, and honorable.”46 There was no evidence of anything suspicious: 
there was no evidence of secret collusion, or payments or promises to members of 
Congress. The age and inability to travel of the client made it seem he could not 
prosecute his claim without terrible hardship. If there was any  right to petition the 
government, ought it not extend to the aged, who might need to hire someone on 
their behalf? Child argued that Trist had a right to personally petition Congress, 
and that this right must mean the right to hire an agent to petition on his behalf.47 
The Court sided with Trist. It  concluded that the sale of influence itself, 
whether or not accompanied by  payments or suspicious behavior, was a civic 
wrong. The court addressed the contingent nature of the claim--the “pecuniary 
interest at stake” made it “contrary  to the plainest principles of public policy.”48 
The contingency made it more likely  to “inflame” the avarice, making it a worse 
problem, but the core problem was the practice of paying someone else to make 
one’s arguments to people in authority, which threatened to undermine the moral 
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fabric of civic society. The practice would have the tendency to corrode public 
ethics indirectly and to enable exchanges.49 The member of Congress, who might 
be offered something (directly or indirectly) in exchange for political action, 
might be more likely to forget his obligations. 
The Court was concerned about corrupting citizens, as well. Citizens’ vir-
tue is the “foundation of a republic,” the Court explained.50 Citizens have an im-
portant public office to fill, as “[t]hey are at once sovereigns and subjects.”51 
While public servants are obliged to be “animated in the discharge of their duties 
solely  by considerations of right, justice, and the public good,” citizens have a 
“correlative duty“ to “exhibit  truth, frankness, and integrity” in their conversa-
tions “with those in authority.”52 According to the Court, “Any departure from the 
line of rectitude in such cases, is not only  bad in morals, but involves a public 
wrong.”53 
The citizens in this case are both the Child and Trist. The lobbyist’s own 
integrity  was threatened by the practice, because the lobbyist is paid to represent 
political views not  held by  the lobbyist. This is unlike a lawyer-client relationship, 
because in general in a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer has no separate, in-
dependent civic relationship  to the private matter. In a lobbyist-client relationship, 
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the lobbyist, by  virtue of being a citizen, has a distinct relationship to what he 
himself might believe. He is selling his own citizenship, or one of the obligations 
of his own citizenship, for a fee. In this sense, agreeing to work, for pay, on politi-
cal issues is more akin to selling the personal right to vote than selling legal skills. 
The lobbyist has a separate and distinct obligation to pursue public ends, and 
while they  may be allowed to express self-interest in the vote, they have, as a citi-
zen, an obligation to honor and love the equality of the political system.  
As in Marshall, the Court treated lobbying in terms of its general effects--
the potential for a “corrupt corps of venal solicitors!”, not just its individual 
ones.54 A general acceptance of lobbying would lead to a corrupt culture. Individ-
ual paid lobbying could not be allowed because it  would lead to corporate paid 
lobbying:
If any of the great corporations of the country  were to hire adventurers 
who make market of themselves in this way, to procure the passage of a 
general law with a view to the promotion of their private interests, the 
moral sense of every  right-minded man would instinctively denounce the 
employer and employed as steeped in corruption, and the employment as 
infamous.55
Why would the “right-minded man” denounce the practice? Is it  because 
of a quasi-religious sense that  this kind of market is morally wrong, or because of 
something else? The  Court emphasized public morality, arguing that “[i]f the in-
stances [of lobbying] were numerous, open, and tolerated, they would be regarded 
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as measuring the decay of the public morals and the degeneracy of the times.”56 
Since we do not live in the minds of the time, we can only guess what was 
imagined--that people would start to see government as a place from which re-
sources could be extracted, instead of a source of aggregated interests and beliefs. 
That such a view would lead to strategic use of public resources, and plunder. 
Child unsuccessfully argued that the case should simply be understood as 
a classic lawyer-client relationship. Civic virtue might be threatened if lobbyists 
could be hired on bills related to general matters, he argued, but is not when it is 
simply  an old man getting what he is due.57  However, the court  concluded that 
there was no clear way to regularly  distinguish between secret, inappropriate lob-
bying and appropriate paid lobbying.58  Furthermore, because small private bills 
are not known by the public, and the discussions around the bills are often “whis-
pered,” advocacy for private bills creates huge opportunities for advocates to in-
duce legislators to support these bills for the wrong reasons, and, again, for 
bribery.59 Instead of engaging in objective fact-finding, “[t]hose whose duty it is 
to investigate” hear unsupported facts by self-interested parties;60 without a check 
on the facts communicated by  the self-interested parties, legislators might simply 
rubber stamp the bill. 
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Trist was cited for many  years for its principles. A few years later, in an 
1880 case to enforce a contract for influencing the Turkish government’s purchase 
of arms, the Supreme Court  reiterated the broad principle, even though the Turk-
ish government, not the American government, was at  stake.61  The defendant in 
that case sold over $1 million in arms to the Turkish government in 1870 and 
1871--the choice of arms was directly influenced by  the plaintiff, a consul for the 
Turkish government, who then sought a commission, as previously  agreed.62 The 
consul first “used his influence…to condemn the Spencer gun,” and then “brought 
out a Winchester gun, a sample of which he always kept in his office for the very 
purpose, whenever opportunity offered, of presenting its claims. It appears, how-
ever, that the Bey did not, from the first, like that gun.” Therefore, “‘Oscanyan 
had to use all his ingenuity and skill and perseverance and patience’” to get the 
Bey to agree to purchase Winchesters.63 
Such a contract, the Court held, was not valid. 
Personal influence to be exercised over an officer of government in 
the procurement of contracts, as justly observed by counsel, is not 
a vendible article in our system of laws and morals, and the courts 
of the United States will not lend their aid to the vendor to collect 
the price of the article.....This is true when the vendor holds no of-
ficial relations with the government, though the turpitude of the 
transaction becomes more glaring when he is also its officer.64
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The Oscanyan court distinguished between private vendors and profes-
sional services, as the Trist court had. The principle doesn’t answer the question, 
though: the Oscanyan Court had to grapple with how to distinguish personal in-
fluence from the routine activities of salespeople. In selling goods, contingent 
fees, or fees based in some way on success, were routine, and those cases were 
cited for evidence that the court should enforce the contract.65 Therefore contin-
gency  could not be the evil. Instead, the civic wrong was based on the sale of pri-
vate influence in public procurement decisions. 
[W]here, instead of placing before the officers of the government the in-
formation which should properly guide their judgments, personal influ-
ence is the means used to secure the sales, and is allowed to prevail, the 
public good is lost sight of, unnecessary expenditures are incurred, and, 
generally, defective supplies are obtained, producing inefficiency in the 
public service.66
The sale of the personal ability to influence was perceived to lead to poor 
choices by public officers, as they are influenced to make choices for reasons that 
are pressed by those who have profit, not the public good, behind them. 
The fact that Oscayan took money and transformed it into power while 
using the rhetoric of reason--explaining why the Spencer was defective, pointing 
out the advantages of the Winchester--makes his activity more disturbing, because 
the art of lobbying undermines the nature of reason and information itself in a po-
litical society. 
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The Civic Threat
The evil of lobbying comes not from the particular corrupt intent in any 
particular case--rather, the evil comes from the fact that the “contract tends di-
rectly to those results.”67  The fact one can pay  another to get legislative results 
“furnishes a temptation to the plaintiff, to resort to corrupt means or improper de-
vices, to influence legislative action.” This, in turn, leads to a broad array of “in-
fluences” which are both “destructive of the “character” of the legislature and “fa-
tal to public confidence in its action."68
There is a sense that lobbying threatened to lead people to put private in-
terests where public ones should exist. As the early Kentucky case refusing to en-
force a contract  to get a remission said, someone paid to persuade will be “in-
duced use his influence for the money he is to obtain; when, as a patriot and a 
citizen, he should only act for the good of his country, and under an impartial 
sense of justice, tempered with mercy. We can readily imagine the dangers likely 
to result from the corrupt artifices of mercenary  managers in procuring pardons 
and remissions.”69If a commitment to civic virtue is the foundation of the repub-
lic, as Montesquieu and the drafters of the Constitution believed,70 lobbying en-
courages at least one class of citizens to imagine themselves outside of govern-
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ment, bringing neither their own interests, nor the public interest, to the attention 
of government. Interests that are private are recast in public terms or in private 
terms that may not be accurate. Those citizens who sell their service are violating 
their own individual civic promise to the State, by giving up their own responsi-
bility to think of the public good and to use the public privileges they have been 
given for the public good. A private citizen often plays a public role in political 
society, as when he or she casts a vote. She has an obligation in the moment of 
casting the vote to use it in a way  consistent with her own beliefs either about 
public good or about her own private good, or about familial or group interest. 
But if she sells that vote, she violates her own obligations to the public in the 
moment of sale. Lobbying legitimates a kind of routine sophistry, and a casual 
approach towards public argument. It leads people to mistrust the sincerity  of 
public arguments, and weakens their own sense of obligation to the public good. 
In these lobbying cases courts filled what they  saw as an essential gap, 
protecting political society from the threat of oligarchic pressures, but also from 
the threat of a cynical political culture. 
Protection from Temptation and Bribery
On a more pedestrian level, lobbying was seen as the gateway to bribery. 
Bribery  does not now, nor has it ever, had neat lines dividing it  from acceptable 
activity. Bribery at common law was, “the offering of any undue reward or 
remuneration to any public officer or other person intrusted with a public duty, 
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with a view to influence his behavior in the discharge of his duty.”71  In the 
mid-century, many  states passed bribery statutes with broad language covering 
any kind of effort to influence using things of value, but they  were rarely 
enforced. 
The language of lobbying was not always neatly separated from the lan-
guage of bribery: high contingent fees, for example, were referred to as 
“bribes.”72 As a matter of association and categorization, lobbying enabled brib-
ery, or, in some cases, was bribery. This lumping allows for passages like the fol-
lowing one, that skips between ideas that play  distinct roles in modern legal 
grammar--influence, lobbying, and bribery--as if they are presumptively  con-
nected: 
A contract for lobby  services, for personal influence, for mere importuni-
ties to members of the legislature, or other official body, for bribery  or cor-
ruption, or for seducing or influencing them by any other arguments, per-
suasions, or inducements than as directly and legitimately bear upon the 
merits of the pending application, is illegal, and against public policy, and 
void.73 
 The California Constitution defined lobbying as follows: "Any person who 
seeks to influence the vote of a member of the legislature by bribery, promise of 
reward, intimidation, or any other dishonest means, shall be guilty of lobbying, 
which is hereby declared a felony."74 
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Even where lobbying wasn’t defined in a way that we might currently de-
fine bribery, paid personal influence was seen as the first step  towards bribery. 
The “law forbids the inchoate step,” in bribery.75   Lobbying leads to bribery 
through temptation--private meetings with money and no one watching make it 
hard for enough individuals to resist, even if the majority succeed.  “If the 
tempted agent be corrupt himself, and disposed to corrupt  others, the transition 
requires but a single step.”76  Legal lobbying allows citizens to go and tell other 
citizens that  they can take money and turn it  into political power, and once that 
traffic is legal, they will figure out ways to skirt the law but in fact be engaged in 
offering value in exchange for influence.
Because lobbying leads to bribery, the job of the courts is to protect 
against the temptation. Courts routinely held that it  was not necessary to find that 
the parties agreed to some “corrupt” or “secret” action. Instead, the question was 
whether the “contract tends directly to those results.”77 A contract was problem-
atic when it “furnishes a temptation to the plaintiff to resort to corrupt means or 
improper devices to influence legislative action.” Such a temptation leads to brib-
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ery, which in turn leads to destroy the institution and undermine public 
confidence.78  
The role of temptation in lobbying contracts was similar to the role of 
temptation in conflicts of interest  cases. In McGhee v. Lindsay, an Alabama case, 
the court refused to enforce a public contract in which a state-employed supervi-
sor had an interest. The court talked about how no man can serve two masters 
with conflicting interests.79 Doing so creates “a temptation perhaps . . . too strong 
for resistance by  men of flexible morals, or hacknied in the common devices of 
worldy business, ... which would betray them into gross misconduct, and even 
crime.”80 The court focused on creating structures where temptations do not exist 
for men with “flexible morals” or who are steeped in the usual run of business 
behavior. In fact, there was no evidence of bribery or an incorrect price, but the 
court adopted the policy of not enforcing these contracts as a “preventive check 
against such temptations and seductions.”81 
The Vermont Supreme Court, for instance, held that “the sale by an indi-
vidual of his personal influence and solicitations, to procure the passage of a pub-
lic or private law by the legislature, is void as being prejudicial to sound legisla-
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tion, manifestly injurious to the interests of the state, and in express and unques-
tionable contravention of public policy.”82  It is totally irrelevant to look at 
whether the sale was effective or not, and whether or not anything improper was 
done. “The principle of these decisions has no relation to the equities between the 
parties, but is controlled solely by the tendency of the contract.”83 A person “can-
not with propriety be employed to exert his personal influence, whether it be great 
or little, with individual members, or to labor privately in any  form with them out 
of the legislative halls, in favor of, or against  any act or subject of, legislation.”84 
The court should discourage those practices “if it corrupts or tends to corrupt 
some, or if it deceives or tends to deceive or mislead some.”85
Contingency Fees
Many of these cases, you may note, involve contingency fees. It is diffi-
cult to separate the law of contingent fees and the law of lobbying, because so 
many of the cases involved contingencies, and contingencies were often a factor. 
While other factors were worked out more on a case-by-case basis, contingent fee 
arrangements for political influence were almost always void.86  In particular, 
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payment of the contract was dependent upon the outcome of particular legislation, 
it would not be enforced. Courts would routinely declare that “[a]ll contracts for a 
contingent compensation for obtaining legislation…are void by  the policy of the 
law,”87  or “[a] contract for a contingent compensation…to use personal…influ-
ence on legislators is void by the policy of the law.”88"
The prominent role of contingencies in these cases have led some com-
mentators to see the lobbying cases as a reflection of an attitude towards cham-
perty, and contingencies, not towards lobbying. However, the cases themselves 
undermine that argument. One of the arguments made by Trist was that it  was a 
contingent fee, and therefore illegitimate. However, as the case is reported, this 
sentence precedes the opinion:
“A good deal was said in the argument on both sides about contingent 
fees, but in view of the grounds on which the court based its judgment, a report of 
that part of the argument would be of no pertinence.”89
The language of the decisions, even when they were not as clear as Trist, 
emphasized personal influence, not contingencies. Some did not mention contin-
Lobbying
 32
87 Marshall v. Baltimore  O. R. Co., 57 U.S. 314, 336 (1853) .See also, Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 
5 Watts  S. 315 (Penn. 1843); Wood v. McCann, 36 Ky. 366 (1838); Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 
200 (1856).
88Marshall, 57 U.S. at 336See also,.Clippinger, 5 Watts S. at 315; Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb. 361(S. 
Ct. Gen. Term 1855); Frost v. Belmont, 88 Mass. 152 (1863).
89 Trist v.Child, 88 U.S. 441 (1874). 
gent fees as a factor at all.90 In a 1905 Nebraska case, Stroemer v. Van Orsdel, a 
lawyer for certain Indian tribes “presented the interests and claims” before the 
Secretary of the Department of the Interior, who drew up  a bill, which the lawyer 
then advocated for,  primarily  in public forums--a committee of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives.91 The law was passed; the lawyer asked for his money, 
his client pled illegal contract for lobbying. The client argued, to no avail, that 
contingent fee arrangements for legislation were per se illegal; relying on the 
logic of Trist, the court instead held that so long as it  was a contract for profes-
sional services instead of personal influence, the means of payment was irrele-
vant. The Court rejected its earlier holding that all contingent agreements to se-
cure the passage of a bill are “vicious, illegal, and void.” Instead, the character of 
the contract, not the “character of the fee,” should control.92 
Moreover, in a contract in which “it does not appear that they were em-
ployed by reason of any personal or political influence,” the fact that it was con-
tingent did not render it void.93 
Personal Influence vs. Professional Services
Lobbying
 33
90 See, e.g., McBratney v. Chandler, 22 Kan 692 (Kan. 1879). 
91 103 N.W. 1053 (Neb. 1905)
92 Id. at 1055-56.
93 Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Botsford,  44 P. 3, 5 (Kan. 1896)
The key  to the doctrine was the ability  to distinguish between illegitimate 
sale of private influence and legitimate, lawyering-like behavior. Courts would 
generally  invalidate any  contracts where someone was paid in order to use their 
personal influence to shape official action. Contracts for personal influence were 
“not merely voidable, or capable of rescission, but are mala in se, absolutely void, 
and without effect.”94   Personal services involved personal visits; professional 
services involved presenting to committees or in public forums
For instance a contract to help pass legislation was upheld because the 
plaintiff “was not a lobbyist, and he had no acquaintance or influence with any 
member of the legislature.... It did not appear that…he asked or solicited any 
member of the legislature to vote for the bills.”95
The popular hornbook that I mentioned above, that stated that lobbying 
services were generally illegal, added that: 
The rule, however, does not apply to an agreement, for purely professional 
services, such as the drafting of a petition to set forth a claim for present-
ment to the legislature, attending the taking of testimony, collecting facts, 
preparing arguments, and submitting them orally or in writing to a com-
mittee or other proper authority, and other services of like character. They 
rest on the same principle of ethics as professional services rendered in a 
court of justice, and are no more objectionable.96
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Many of the more interesting cases involved this line-drawing.  In Califor-
nia, when an attorney "prepared the bill, which afterward became a law, and made 
arguments in support of it, and caused it to be introduced in both departments of 
the legislature, appeared and argued the  measure before at least one committee of 
that body, and also before the governor when the bill reached his hands,” the con-
tract was valid. There was no evidence that the attorney  used any dishonest, se-
cret, or unfair means.97 
A critical factor in California, and elsewhere, was where the arguments 
were made, and whether or not they were public. If the arguments were made in a 
committee setting, the services were likely legal. If the lobbyist was drafting or 
helping create materials for private or secret meetings, it was more like personal 
influence lobbying, and therefore illegal, whereas public arguments were pre-
sumptively legitimate. An individual had an absolute right to privately meet with 
a representative, but might not pay someone else to do the same. Private persua-
sion brought a risk of bribery and undermined the system; public persuasion was 
more akin to arguments in court.  
In Oregon, for example, lobbying was  defined as meeting with individual 
legislators, using personal influence to "privately importune" them. Presentations 
to the entire legislature or to committees, or any group  were permissible.98 In Ne-
braska, the line was also between public argument and private solicitation. Writ-
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ing a petition or making a public argument before the legislature or a committee 
thereof was permissible, but using personal influence was prohibited. "It is cer-
tainly important… that the legislature be perfectly free from any extraneous influ-
ence which may either corrupt or deceive the members of any of them"99
In Wisconsin by 1896, lobbying was defined as a corrupt action involving 
personal influence or solicitation around legislation.100 The “preparation of peti-
tions, taking of testimony, collecting of facts, preparing of arguments, and submit-
ting   them, orally  or in writing, to committees or other proper authority, and serv-
ices of like character, which are intended to reach only the reason of those to be 
influenced, are legitimate.” In Vermont, while it was illegal to sell personal influ-
ence, a person could hire someone else to “conduct an application to the legisla-
ture” and pay for services related to putting together documents, statements, evi-
dence or arguments related to that application.  However, all of the relevant  work 
had to be related to petitions that would go to the legislature itself or a committee 
of the legislature, not a committee member or individual politician.101 Relatedly, 
A representative could not hide his interest in a pending bill’s success.102
A contract with any  taint of private or secret  influence would be com-
pletely  void, not even the part of the contract for public, committee arguments 
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could be saved. For example, an Oregon lobbyist was hired by a fishing industry 
interest group to convince the legislature not to pass a law banning fishing by 
fish-wheels. The lobbyist submitted information to the legislature and committees 
and made presentations, but also used his personal influence with legislators and 
committee members. He did not tell anyone he was representing the fishing inter-
est group. There was no evidence of any money being paid, and the court explic-
itly noted that what he did might not be severe enough to be criminally punished. 
Nonetheless, the failure to disclose his interest in the work rendered the entire 
contract unenforceable.103
Contracts involving actual lawyers were difficult, because of the blend of 
services that were offered and provided. The services to draft a bill, for example, 
might lead to an attempt to personally influence legislators to support  a bill. How-
ever, as difficult as lawyer cases were, they made the non-lawyer cases easier 
Non-lawyers, couldn’t make contracts around legislative services, because it was 
clear that non-lawyers were not able to provide professional legal services, so the 
contract would have to be for personal influence. In Wisconsin, two railroad com-
panies agreed not to compete for the same government land grant, and one of the 
companies offered to help  the other procure the grant in exchange for a portion of 
the land if it were granted. According to the court, a lawyer could contract for 
compensation for services like drafting bills or presenting evidence and arguing 
before the legislature or its committees. But a non-lawyer is, "incapable of render-
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ing such services." "What efforts could they make, what aid or assistance could 
they  give, what services could they  render, except such as are justly  characterized 
as lobbying?”104 
The Plains states, where the populists political movements were the 
strongest, were the least  forgiving of any hint of personal influence. In one case, a 
landowner agreed to pay a lobbyist to procure legislation allowing parties who 
had settled on land to buy it for a low price. The court held that contracts to pro-
cure legislation can be enforced when only fair and honorable means were used, 
and especially when the legislation results in a public benefit. However, this con-
tract was void because, "that the unavoidable inference [was] that he solicited the 
personal aid of members of congress in doing all that was necessary or could be 
done to secure the passage of the law."105 
There was a small subset of cases involving governments lobbying gov-
ernments. A county commissioner attended a session of the state board of equali-
zation in the interests of the county: his goal was to induce the board not to raise 
the amount of assessed property  of the county. The board of county commission-
ers paid him from the salary  fund. A taxpayer successfully  challenged this as in-
appropriate lobbying. The court said it was improper because "it is no part of the 
duty of a commissioner, which is imposed by the law, to visit the state board of 
equalization in the capacity  of a lobbyist in the interests of the county…" For this 
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case it  is not necessary  to decide if these services were legal, but it is certain that 
they can't be paid for from the salary fund.106
For example, there was a bill pending before the California legislature that 
would have required one county, Colusa County, to pay  money  to another county. 
The Colusa County Board of Supervisors employed Counsel "to secure, by means 
of personal solicitation and by means of private interview with members of the 
legislature of California, and by means of lobbying, the defeat of the bill."107 The 
Court said it was permissible for a client to employ counsel to influence the legis-
lature by open and public presentation of facts, arguments, and appeals to reason, 
but not to secretly approach the members of such a body with a view to influence 
their action at a time and in a manner that do not  allow the presentation of oppo-
site views.108 
Some would simply  void a contract  if it sounded at all like lobbying. Lob-
bying services for one Nebraska court were "corrupt in nature and against public 
policy." It was not clear what the service was, exactly, though there was some tes-
timony that it was “to pay  somebody to keep still, and do as we wanted them to." 
The court held that "Every  consideration of public policy demands that money 
paid out by  a public contractor to induce men to keep still, to make them do as he 
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wants them to, to lobby to secure him contracts, or to secure the allowance of es-
timates, should be considered as a corrupt and unlawful expenditure."109
Part II: Denouement
In 1890, Massachusetts enacted a lobbying registration law, followed by 
Wisconsin and Maryland, and several other states. The registration law created a 
sense that lobbying was itself professional, instead of personal, and made it harder 
to argue that non-lawyers could not lobby without offering personal services. 
Moreover, the growing power of the industry, and legitimization of key players 
within it, likely made it seem less distasteful to courts. Lobbyists recast contracts 
in terms of professional services that might previously  have been cast as contracts 
for personal influence. The two aspects of the contract that were routinely  sepa-
rated in those years became joined: drafting and publicly presenting a bill, and 
individual meetings with legislators, both became known as “lobbying.”110
However, the lobbying cases were never directly  overturned on the basis 
of the principles that animated them. In terms of the doctrine itself, what we see is 
a change in the treatment of contract law and the changing role of the First 
Amendment. 
The Change in Contract Law
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The biggest doctrinal change was that courts stopped using contract law as 
a method for enforcing public policy. As Professor Pettit  has demonstrated in his 
masterful summary of public policy  contract cases, 19th Century courts were far 
more willing to use public policy  than current courts.111 Courts saw it to be their 
duty not to enforce contracts that might hurt personal morality, the family, or 
commerce, and so used public policy as a reason not to enforce otherwise legal 
gambling, prostitution contracts and contracts in restraint of trade.112  They 
showed a broad willingness to scrutinize a contract’s impact more broadly and its 
possible effect on the relationship between the society and citizens.113 The current 
doctrine of unenforceable contracts for reasons of public policy is very narrow, 
and largely tracks contracts made in violation of criminal laws, whereas the 19th 
century courts used the un-enforceability doctrine far more broadly. As this prac-
tice changed, courts started enforcing contracts presumptively, not investigating 
their civic impact. Criminal law, instead of civil law, became the locus of debates 
about bribery and corruption; states started regulating lobbying instead of banning 
it, so the question of a right to lobby simply didn’t arise. 
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Herrick v. Barzeme,114 a 1920 Oregon case, exemplifies the shifts within 
the relative value of contract law In Herrick, a man hired a lawyer on a contingent 
fee to draft and push legislation on his behalf. The Oregon court found the con-
tract valid and enforceable. It was an instance, the court held, of payment for 
“persuasion” as separate from “influence.”115   Most of the language tracked the 
earlier cases discussed above. The service was a professional service; an attorney 
may draft  petitions, collect facts, and prepare and submit arguments to a commit-
tee. But at the same time, the obligation of the court to declare contracts void was 
given a smaller role, and viewed with greater skepticism. Freedom of contract, not 
public morality, played the central role in the case. According to the court, free-
dom of contract is so important that agreements won’t be held void as against 
public policy unless they are “clearly contrary to public policy or manifestly tend 
to injure the public in some way.”116  The language placed greater weight on the 
court’s obligation to enforce contracts, and to find a showing of injury if they  void 
the contract. Likewise, the court rehearsed the idea that in deciding if a contract is 
void, it should look at the tendency of the agreement and what was contemplated 
by the parties, not the actions. However, it took that  language in a different direc-
tion, stating that an agreement would only be void if it contemplates improper ac-
tion by its express or implied terms: the scope of the tendency argument is se-
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verely curtailed by this shift.117 There is a large difference between invalidating 
all contracts for private influence (prior Oregon practice) and only those which 
directly or implicitly contemplate a bribe. 
The Nebraska case I cited above, for the proposition that contingency  fee 
arrangements to pass laws were not per se illegitimate, is also a transition case in 
that it narrowed the definition of illegal lobbying to accompany only arrange-
ments with an element of secrecy. While it gave lip service to the illegality of us-
ing personal influence, secrecy replaced personal influence as the core danger in 
that case.118 
A Supreme Court  case that exemplified that shift was the 1927 case  in 
which a stockholder agreed to help  get a charter for a railroad company.119 He 
agreed to work the local government and secure the enactment of local ordinances 
approving the construction of a proposed railroad line in a particular location. 
Without  the ordinance change, other elements of the contract made no sense--all 
of the other agreements about supplying materials and services were meaningless 
without governmental approval. After the arrangement fell apart, the would-be-
political persuader was sued by  his would-be-business partner. He defended his 
refusal to perform his side of the contracts referring to the earlier cases, saying 
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that since part  of the contract was in order to get legislative action, the entire con-
tract was void.120 
The court upheld the contract, distinguishes this case from cases like Trist, 
where “personal influence” was used to effect legislative changes.121  However, 
though Trist was given lip service, the it was an opinion written by Justice Pierce 
Butler opinion, who adopted a strong version of the freedom of contract jurispru-
dence. The case is an expression of Butler’s contracts ideology, not his vision of 
free speech: it  says nothing about lobbying being fundamentally protected, and a 
great deal about the importance of not disturbing contracts. The court’s own un-
derstanding of the difference between it  and Trist is that there was no paid, pro-
fessional lobbyist—the person seeking legislative action had a personal property 
interest in the charter, so he was not prostituting himself, as it were, or represent 
political views different than his own.122 
But this case is different. Drummond was not employed by  Steele or by 
the railroad company to secure the passage of the ordinances. He was in-
terested as an owner of property... The mere fact that he owned property 
that might be favorably affected does not tend to discredit  him, or to make 
evil his undertaking to obtain the ordinances. His interest  in having the 
railroad extended into St. Andrews gave him the right in every legitimate 
way to urge the passage of appropriate ordinances. There is nothing that 
tends to indicate that in the promotion or passage of them there was any 
departure from the best standards of duty  to the public. The contention that 
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Drummond's agreement to secure their passage was contrary to public pol-
icy cannot be sustained.123
The idea of “influence” as a non-vendible persists in these cases, even as 
they  back away from invalidating the contracts. However, the dissipation of the 
courts role in policing public morality in contracts cases gradually  made room for 
a different vision of lobbying. 
In 1941, in Textile Mills, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutional 
of treasury regulations that stated that “Sums of money expended for lobbying 
purposes,” are not tax deductible.124 It did not consider a First Amendment argu-
ment, and inasmuch as a policy  argument was raised against the differential 
treatment of lobbying versus other business expenses, the court shrugged it off, 
citing to Trist v. Child. “Contracts to spread such insidious influences through leg-
islative halls have long been condemned.”125 As with the previous century’s hold-
ings, broad, prophylactic rules were acceptable: 
Whether the precise arrangement here in question would violate the rule of 
those cases is not material...There is no reason why, in absence of clear 
Congressional action to the contrary, the rule-making authority cannot 
employ that general policy in drawing a line between legitimate business 
expenses and those arising from that family  of contracts to which the law 
has given no sanction.126 
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 Lobbying is still treated as “insidious” and  lobbying contracts as those “to 
which law has given no sanction.” The language in Textile Mills provides more 
evidence that Drummond was really a case about the changing role of contract 
law, not a case about loosening condemnations of the sale of personal influence.  
The Rise of the First Amendment
The next two cases--United States v. Rumely127  and United States v. 
Harriss128--signal a more important shift. While they do not directly address the 
Constitutionality  of lobbying, they strongly hint at a Constitutionally protected 
right. Both cases deal with the scope of the authority of Congress to mandate dis-
closure by  lobbyists, and both come in the wake of the 1946 Federal Regulation 
of Lobbying Act. In both cases, the Court reads the power of Congress narrowly, 
in part to avoid Constitutional issues. However, the cases are doctrinally compli-
cated because while they imply that there is some First Amendment right  around 
lobbying, they provide no guidance on the scope of that right, or the logic or rea-
son for that right. Because they don’t technically establish a right, they don’t have 
to confront the conflict  between the existence of a right and the former cases 
which clearly  treated paid lobbying as outside the scope of Constitutional protec-
tion. 
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Rumely suggested that there were fewer constitutional rights for represen-
tations made directly to congress members than member-to-member or –public 
political activity, because it read the authority  of investigation to encompass only 
the former. It held that Congress had not authorized the investigations of non-
lobbying behavior, therefore implicitly creating a First Amendment divide be-
tween lobbying behavior and non-lobbying political behavior, with the latter hav-
ing more protection.129 
In Harriss the Court held that because only  a narrower definition held in 
the FLRA, Congress was within its rights demanding disclosure. In response to a 
challenge that it was unconstitutionally  vague and violated the First Amendment, 
the Court limited its scope to only  those paid lobbyists who have direct interaction 
with members of Congress on pending legislation, and who are principally inter-
ested in influence.130
As Richard Briffault argues in this volume Harriss is significant because 
“without expressly saying so, the Court clearly  indicated that lobbying is pro-
tected by the First Amendment.”131Later courts and academics have relied on this 
indication. Given the context, it  seems to encompass more than a personal right to 
bring grievances, but it  is also a cautious statutory  case of double avoidance—the 
court is avoiding the Constitutional issue, and in so doing, avoiding having to ex-
plain the scope of the Constitutional issue. 
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After Harriss, lobbying is presumptively protected in the American legal 
imagination. In 1959, the Supreme Court addressed whether a treasury regulation 
denying business expense deductions for political activity  was constitutional. It 
held that it was not unconstitutional, and cited approvingly to Textile Mills.132 A 
few years later, the Court  construed the Sherman Act in a way so that it would not 
cover publicity campaigns. It held that as a matter of statutory construction, pri-
vate entities are immune from Sherman Act liability for efforts to influence legis-
lation,133  and included language indicating that an alternate construction would 
violate the First Amendment. However, the Court’s guidance was again indirect: 
the activities challenged were largely public campaigns, so the Court never ad-
dressed the scope of a right to sell or buy private influence.  
Richard Briffault’s accompanying paper in this volume nicely summarizes 
the developments that led to this consensus after Cammarano.134 It is now widely 
believed among academics that a lobbying ban would be treated as unconstitu-
tional by  the current Supreme Court. After Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court 
held that there is a constitutional right  to pay for political speech implicit in the 
right to make political speech.135 The logic of Buckley, applied to lobbying, bol-
sters the argument that paid lobbying is a protected right. 
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Part III. Doctrinal Implications
 The Supreme Court doctrine of lobbying for the last several years is a history of dicta, 
footnotes, and Constitutional avoidance. In Harriss, Noerr Motor and Rumely, the Court con-
strued statutes in a way that suggested, but did not hold, that there might be a right to pay people 
(or be paid) for personal influence.136 Then in Citizens United, the Court mentioned in passing 
that Congress could not outlaw lobbying, saying, “Congress has no power to ban lobbying 
itself.”137 However, as a matter of Constitutional doctrine, the Supreme Court has not held that 
the petition clause gives citizens any greater rights than the Speech clause,138 nor explained how 
the speech clause directly relates to lobbying.
 However, in the next several years, there are likely to be several challenges to old and 
new laws that regulate lobbying, including laws that limit lobbyists’ capacity to donate to cam-
paigns, and revolving door rules. The states and Courts of Appeals are split on all aspects of the 
scope and constitutional basis of the right to lobby.139 After Citizens United, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down a Connecticut law that banned lobbyists 
from making campaign contributions or fundraising for candidates.140 The case assumed, without 
discussion, that the right to lobby was the same as the right to any other kind of political speech. 
An Ohio Federal Court struck down a statute that banned former legislators and government em-
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ployees from lobbying for a year after leaving their public service.141 On the other hand, in 1999, 
the Fourth Circuit upheld a restriction on lobbyists (and their political action committee clients) 
donating to candidates for office while the assembly was in session. The court held there was an 
especially high risk of corruption when it came to contacts with lobbyists. They are paid in order 
to “effectuate particular outcomes.” 
The pressure on them to perform mounts as legislation winds its way 
through the system. If lobbyists are free to contribute to legislators while 
pet projects sit before them, the temptation to exchange “dollars for politi-
cal favors” can be powerful.142 
The court noted the power pressures at play, and concluded that the state did not need to wait for 
scandal, but could take prophylactic measures.143 The court did not analyze whether this meant 
that the right to be paid lobbyist, or to pay lobbyists, was somehow less protected than other po-
litical speech—its analysis rested on the assumption that it was First Amendment protected, but 
that there was a strong countervailing corruption interest. The method the court used to analyze 
the issue suggests that paid lobbying is not as protected as other forms of political speech. After 
Citizens United, the Fourth Circuit reiterated its approach, upholding North Carolina’s ban on 
lobbyist contributions.144  
 The forgotten history of the law of lobbying is important for analyzing these cases for 
five reasons. First, it undermines an originalist, or post-enactment practice argument for a dis-
tinct First Amendment right to lobby. Second, for the non-originalist constitutional theorist, it 
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provides democracy-enhancing reasons to be suspect of a First Amendment right to lobby. It 
provides persuasive arguments for upholding lobbying limitations. Third, it provides historical 
support for Deborah Hellman’s argument that the right to speak in the political realm does not 
include the right to spend money on that right. Fourth, the long history of cases treating lobbying 
as non-protected is important for separating paid lobbying cases from a general political speech 
analysis. Courts can use this history to make a lobbying-specific, non-derivative, analysis of any 
right to pay to lobby, or be paid to lobby. Such an analysis will reveal that some of the campaign 
finance logic does not apply with the same strength in the lobbying arena. Fifth, the earlier cases 
suggest that it is possible and workable--if not simple--to draw a line between professional ac-
tivities that are protected and those that are not.
Originalism and Post-Enactment Practice
Lobbying
 51
 Modern scholars invoke four Constitutional provisions of the First Amendment in their 
arguments that there is a right pay lobbyists. The first is the freedom of speech, and the second is 
the right to petition the government.145 However, the argument about the existence of a First 
Amendment right is typically fairly brief. For instance, the First Circuit assumes, citing only to 
Harriss, that there is a first amendment right to lobby grounded in the petition clause. It stated, in 
passing, that “paid influence” was “protected by the right “to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievance” guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.146 This 
summary reference to the right to lobby shows up throughout Court opinions.147  A constitutional 
right to lobby is often recognized without a full discussion of whether it exists.148 
 In one of the few Articles directly explaining the constitutional argument, Andrew Tho-
mas argues that the right to pay a lobbyist, and be paid as a lobbyist, derives from the right to 
petition.149 The right to petition pre-existed the Constitution by thousands of years, as a right to 
submit grievances to those in power. The right, as historically understood, only encompassed the 
right to submit a complaint (presumably by the mails, or by leaving it at the office of an official), 
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and no right to be heard.150 Thomas argues that the right to petition necessarily includes the right 
to pay someone to use personal influence to make a petition more effective. Paid petitioning was 
widespread at the time of the Constitutional Convention.151 Thomas chronicles many famous 
people, including people involved in the Constitutional Convention, who were paid to use their 
personal influence. This is evidence, he argues, is that the sale of personal influence must have 
been understood to be protected by the First Amendment. “Since lobbying, even in its most dis-
tasteful forms, has always been a popular means of petitioning American government officials, it 
is almost inconceivable that the Founders did not consider it worthy of First Amendment protec-
tion under the rubric of the right of petition.”152 
 Thomas’ logic does not hold. The only evidence such behaviors show is that lobbying 
was not perceived as unconstitutional. There is no presumption of a “rights”-like status given to 
all the behaviors of the founding generation; he would need to show evidence of a case in which 
paid personal influence was condemned and then defended as a Constitutional right. 
 Additionally, Thomas provides evidence that the use of the petition required the use of the 
mails, and sometimes required others to deliver grievances to government because they could not 
deliver the grievance themselves. “The reductio ad absurdum to which this conception of the 
right of petition leads is that the First Amendment does not protect a citizen's mailing a letter to 
his Congressman because he is paying the Postal Service to deliver the petition.”153 Here, his ar-
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gument is stronger. Some method of delivery must be allowed for the right to send grievances to 
mean anything. 
 However, the right to the most basic method of physical delivery is analytically distinct 
from the right to pay for personal influence. The former (the mails, or paying an agent to deliver 
a petition, or even to help draft a petition) is an extension of the right to petition as a matter of 
course. The right to pay someone to use personal influence is distinct. A court could easily strike 
down all laws that forbade the use of the mails to mail a grievance, while upholding laws that 
forbade the sale and purchase of personal influence. 
 Furthermore, even as a personal matter, there is no right to get a personal audience with 
decision-makers. The right to send a petition cannot, as a matter of logic, include the right to per-
sonal interaction. No government could sustain such a set of obligations. 
 Since we have no simultaneous court cases with the Constitutional convention, we must 
look elsewhere for evidence of original intent. One place to look is the general attitude towards 
the use of money to influence politics that informed the drafters of the Constitution. There is am-
ple evidence that the framers of the constitution were committed to protecting against corruption. 
Government, according to framers James Madison, George Mason, and Benjamin Franklin, 
ought to have the power to protect itself against self-interest and that wherever possible, struc-
tural restraints against using politics to get wealthy should be put in place.154  As Pierce Butler 
said, we needed to protect against the traditions of Britain where “A man takes a seat in parlia-
ment to get an office for himself or friends, or both; and this is the great source from which flows 
its great venality and corruption.155”  The deep antipathy towards the combination of money and 
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politics showed up in the gifts clause of the Constitution, forbidding any kinds of gifts from pub-
lic officers out of fear it would lead to corruption and temptation. This contemporary effort to 
separate “the love of money and the love of power”, as Benjamin Franklin put it, seems like it 
would look suspiciously, not forgivingly, upon the sale of personal influence.156 
The founders, we know, were particularly anxious about the political corruption that led from 
people going into elected office in order to take a later job. The "corner-stone" of the new Consti-
tution, according to George Mason, was the provision designed to keep elected officials from 
going into politics to get lucrative offices for themselves or their friends.157 The logic of this 
clause could be used to support bans on Congressmembers or their staffs taking lobbying jobs. 
As a matter of principle, I think the better argument is that the Constitutional framers weighed 
anti-corruptionism as the central job of government, and would support a lobbying ban. As a di-
rect matter, the founding era gives us no direct evidence for or against a Constitutional protection 
matter. 
 The second place to look for original meanings is the post-enactment practice and treat-
ment of lobbying, which is the orientation of this article. The cases of the last section are strong 
evidence that the First Amendment was not traditionally seen as a protection of the right to paid 
lobbying. They undermine an originalist argument for a right to paid lobbying, inasmuch as prac-
tices that follow the enactment of the Constitution can at least shed light on the normal, public 
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understandings of clauses at the time.158 The “concept” of the scope of the First Amendment did 
not include any protection of lobbying in the first 150 years after adoption. While not as persua-
sive as cases immediately post-ratification, the 19th century cases make the claim that there is an 
original “lobbying protection” principle in the Constitution very difficult to make. 
 
The Democracy-Enabling First Amendment
 Much First Amendment scholarship, while Originalism-invoking, revolves less around 
original meaning and more around prudential concerns and a belief in the fundamental political 
role played by a strong speech protection.  It is originalist only in the sense that the hope of rep-
resentative, limited, government is originalist. The First Amendment is seen has having a broad, 
democracy-enabling role. Within that view of the First Amendment as an essential, political 
amendment, there are legion differences, and a cottage industry of First Amendment theories 
have grown up. Some scholars argue that the First Amendment was designed to promote a ro-
bust, democratic polity. This leads them to argue that in some circumstances, governmental 
abridgments of the technical ability to share words or images, or pay for such sharing, might 
promote the kind of “speech” the First Amendment is designed to protect. On the other hand, 
others--sometimes associated with the “absolutist” school--presume that speech and all speech-
enabling mechanisms are protected, and make no separate, consequentialist analysis in terms of 
the impact of protecting speech on political society. Both of these sets of scholars have very dif-
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ferent, but equally expansive, views of the First Amendment. Those with an absolutist view of 
the First Amendment are unlikely to be persuaded by the arguments of the courts of the last gen-
erations, because they are deeply consequentialist claims about the impact of lobbying on politi-
cal society, and because they are generally skeptical of any justification for government restric-
tions on political behavior. 
 However, any one of the set of scholars who consider speech consequentially--in terms of 
likely rules’ impacts on political society--will find the arguments made in a prior generation im-
portant and perhaps influential in determining whether a lobbying activity ought be protected. 
The modern consequentialist argument is largely that lobbying provides an underproduced public 
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good--information for decision-makers.159 Alternatively, lobbying is bad for the market economy, 
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 In effect, Briffault and others argue that the information that is needed for decision-
making is an under-produced public good. Daniel Farber argues that “Like other widely dis-
persed public benefits, information is likely not only to be underproduced in the private market, 
but also to be insufficiently protected by the political system.” Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech 
without Romance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 561 (1991)He adds, “Consider, for example, the sup-
ply of information about foreign affairs. To the extent that voters seek such information, they can 
often obtain it secondhand without paying the original producer. The free rider problem is exac-
erbated in this context because voters also have an incentive to free ride on the activities of other 
political participants. Because my vote probably will not change the election results, I have little 
incentive to seek relevant information. Even if the information were only privately available, I 
would have little incentive to pay for it. Instead, I might as well sit back and let other people par-
ticipate in politics. I will obtain whatever benefits exist from a good foreign policy regardless of 
whether I participate. The result is predictably straightforward: although information in general is 
likely to be underproduced, political information is even more likely to be underproduced, and 
underproduced to a greater extent. Furthermore, because information producers will capture only 
a tiny share of the ultimate benefits of their product in the form of better government, their lob-
bying activities against censorship similarly will be underfinanced. Therefore, the public good 
argument for protecting speech applies with particular force to political speech.” Id. at 563. This 
argument depends upon the view that either there is a scarcity of information about problems and 
solutions available to decision-makers, or, that there is ample information about problems and 
solutions but that lobbyists hired in order to influence decision-making play a useful role in sort-
ing the relative value, for the public, of these problems and solutions. Most arguments rely more 
because it encourages investment in buying political power instead of improving gadgets. (If one 
can make up to a 400% return on investment in purchasing lobbyist resources to reduce the tax 
rate on ball-bearing manufacturers, and a 20% return by building a better ball-bearing, then one 
is likely to spend money on the lobbying instead of on the ball-bearing improvement. Competi-
tors in the marketplace may be co-lobbyists in the political sphere, making the investment worth 
even more.)160
 The cases that I’ve shared in this article add additional reasons, reasons less grounded in 
a view of efficiency (though that plays some role) and more associated with the consequences of 
paid lobbying on political culture and the civic virtues, by separating political reason, logic, and 
passion from the individual citizen. Paid personal influence, according these earlier cases, im-
pacts political morality, undermines anti-bribery laws, leads to inefficiency and extractive use of 
public resources.   
The relationship between rights and rights to pay
 Furthermore, this history supports the argument, proposed by Deborah Hellman, that a 
personal Constitutional right does not (as Thomas argued) include a right to spend money.161 
Hellman criticizes the Buckley-Citizens United line of cases that held that the right to political 
expression implied a right to spend money on political expression. She removed the question 
from its usual arena—”what is the relationship between money and political speech?”—into a 
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new one—”what is the relationship between money and all constitutionally protected rights?” 
Money, she points out, is useful to the exercise of most of our constitutional rights. How it is dis-
tributed also creates incentives and disincentives to the actual exercise of all of them. The incen-
tive relationship between the distribution of funds and the exercise of speech does not mean that 
all laws limiting certain kinds of spending require the strictest constitutional scrutiny. It would be 
useful to be able to spend money to exercise the right to sexual intimacy, but Congress is free to 
ban prostitution. It might be useful for states to pay people to exercise the constitutionally pro-
tected right to vote, but Congress is free to ban such payments.
 Instead, she argues first, that “democratic decisionmakers are free to decide that organs, 
babies, or citizenship should not be for sale.”162 This part of her argument shares a great deal 
with the bulk of the 19th century treatment of lobbying. The courts decided that personal influ-
ence, like “babies or citizenship,” was not a vendible. 
Lobbying and the Right to Be Heard
 Fourth, the earlier cases should at least force courts to independently analyze lobbying, 
and not automatically see a right to lobby as an outgrowth of a right to spend unlimited money in 
the political context. In other words, even if one adopts the general approach of campaign fi-
nance cases since Buckley v. Valeo, there is a difference between lobbying and political advertis-
ing. The justification of the corporate ability to use the Constitution to defend corporate speech is 
grounded in Bellotti, where the Court held that more speech is better for citizens.163 Bellotti did 
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not create a corporate speech right, but a public right to hear speech, whatever the source. This is 
the logic relied on in Citizens United.  However, the innovative “right to hear” which came from 
Bellotti and is based on a vision of maximizing political information in the public sphere, not in 
government. 
 The sale of personal influence is not part of an open market of any kind, but part of a 
closed market that is only available to office holders by virtue of their official role. Members of 
government have a different relationship to knowledge in the first place, and it would have to be 
grounded in a right to receive information in a personal, private forum from paid influencers, be-
cause they undoubtedly have a right to receive information from any unpaid influencers, and all 
forms of information that are not accompanied by a lobbyist. 
 There is no comparable “press” or other intermediaries that enable a wide ranging discus-
sion. Nor is it like the courtroom. Unlike the right to hire a lawyer, there is no assurance that 
anyone will show up on the “other side” of an issue, and instead a high likelihood that there will 
be agreement across many areas between those who can afford to hire permanent lobbyists. 
 Moreover, the key to the old cases, as we’ve seen, is a separation between personal influ-
ence and other forms of persuasion. Following the old case law, a court could determine that 
there is a right to hire professionals to draft legislation, figure out strategies to get it through, and 
prepare testimony, but no similar right to hire someone to use personal influence. 
Line Drawing
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 Fourth, the cases show that there were manageable standards that operated successfully 
for many years, including through the growth of the country in the post-civil war years. The key 
feature was the distinction between personal and professional services.  The Massachussetts 
court explained, “And the distinction we have said is obvious between the solicitation or per-
sonal influence exerted to secure legislation, and legitimate services rendered to enable legisla-
tors to understand the merits of the measures which they are called to pass upon.”164 By the time 
that court made that claim, in 1920, a similar line had been operational in most states for fifty 
years. 
 In retrospect, the line looks almost impossibly difficult to draw, but that is of course true 
of most of our most important line-drawing exercises. Neither Federalism, nor the Equal Protec-
tion clause, nor the modern First Amendment provides easy lines to distinguish between what is 
and is not protected. Instead, they represent values that are implemented in decisions through a 
careful, but imprecise use of standards and factors. The resilience of the forgotten law of lobby-
ing is evidence that a doctrine separating protected and unprotected activity is possible. 
What it doesn’t prove
 The desirability of an activity and its constitutionality are frequently conflated. The his-
tory in this paper provides a strong rebuttal to the claim that lobbying is protected by the First 
Amendment, but it makes no similar claim about whether or not lobbying should be banned or 
highly regulated. Nor does this paper endorse a full-throated return to Trist v. Child. There is an 
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anti-political element to the old cases, just as there is an anti-political element to a “right to 
lobby” claim. Courts, instead of legislatures, are the regulators of political rules. In the old 
model, courts would refuse to enforce contracts that they judged to be problematically corrupt, 
meaning that some lobbying contracts would be legitimate, while others would not. In the new 
model, courts  have the right to overturn legislative judgment that political society is threatened.
 Instead, the cases should be used as support for legislative experiments, supported by the 
courts. The nature of money and politics is one of a constant cat and mouse game--one which is 
sometimes despairingly referred to as the “hydraulics of campaign finance reform.”165 Whatever 
rules are passed, those with concentrated power may find ways to get around and find ways to 
turn money into power in a way that undermines representative government. For democratic self-
government to persist, the public must be constantly aware of the use and abuse of rules, and 
have the flexibility to adapt and adjust rules when they are abused. In a system where those with 
money are always trying to find access to power, and the hands of the public are tied by the First 
Amendment, democracy will tend towards oligarchy, whereas in a system where the public is as 
flexible as the concentrated interests, the possibility of self-government remains. 
 The fundamental conflicts in money and politics and tradeoffs that cannot be abstractly 
resolved, but are best resolved by those living inside the political culture, recognizing those 
tradeoffs. An absolute ban on lobbying has costs that citizens of Montana, for example, might 
accept, whereas citizens of Connecticut might not. For example, the Consumer Federation of 
America hires lobbyists, and might actively and persuasively oppose a ban on paid lobbying in 
Connecticut, arguing that membership groups would be left without a voice, whereas in Montana 
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the citizens might decide that membership groups being “without a voice” was a price worth 
paying (as it were) for getting rid of the culture of paid lobbyists in Missoula. A tax on lobbyists 
might work in one state, and not another--inasmuch as we are all fumbling towards self-
government, with no clear answers, the use of states as democratic laboratories seems particu-
larly important when it comes to the regulation of money for political ends. The aggressive role 
of the courts in creating lobbying policy, both then and now, strikes me as misguided. 
Conclusion 
 It is not a propitious time for a serious discussion of the scope of the right to pay for per-
sonal influence, or to be paid for personal influence. The Supreme Court in Citizens United 
lightly mentioned that laws banning lobbying would be unconstitutional, and most scholars seem 
to agree. It is unlikely that five members of the current Supreme Court would seriously consider 
a claim that lobbying bans are Constitutional. However, it is an important time. The scope of 
paid lobbying protections has taken on a new urgency in the last three years. So long as Buckley 
v. Valeo and Citizens United are upheld, the people of the states and of the country have a limited 
set of ways in which they can structure the relationship between political power and financial 
power. They can no longer pass laws banning corporate spending around elections. They can no 
longer pass limits on how much any entity can spend around an election. Given these limits, the 
most promising route for many people is to pass laws that ban spending or contributions from 
particular categories of donors, like government contractors, companies with substantial foreign 
elements, and lobbyists. 
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 The history I have sketched here ideally suggests a new model for thinking about the im-
plications of the right to petition as personal and non vendible. There are many more areas for 
scholarly development,  including the operation of a personal right in a corporate setting, and the 
relationship of lobbying to the interest group model of politics and to associations and the right 
to associate. Those issues, I would argue, are consequentialist, not constitutional, concerns, but 
important to address. Within the constitutional framework, how far could a ban on lobbying ex-
tend? Could legislatures ban all kinds of sales of personal influence? Is there a difference be-
tween a right to buy and a right to sell personal influence? How could legislatures treat CEOs or 
heads of companies? Would they simply be allowed to lobby on their own time so long as they 
were unpaid, for all positions? These cases can’t answer these questions, but they suggest certain 
arguments that could be used in addressing them. 
 For a good part of our country’s history, courts actively scrutinized contracts to influence 
government and found many of them unenforceable as against public policy. Lobbying was also 
perceived to lead to use by corporations, which would use their ability to amass capital to wield 
disproportionate power, and lead to absolute corruption of government. It would undermine pub-
lic morals. Such behaviors will necessarily occur, the courts recognized, but by giving the im-
primatur of law to them, it suggests that civic privileges can be sold, which undermines a general 
political ethos in which such things are unsellable. There are serious countervailing interests, but 
all of these concerns still hold, and if anything, are more pressing than ever now. 
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